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The Solar Dynamics Observatory (SDO) was launched on February 11, 2010.
Over the next three months, the spacecraft was raised from its launch orbit into
its final geosynchronous orbit and its systems and instruments were tested and
calibrated in preparation for its desired ten year science mission studying the
Sun. A great deal of activity during this time involved the spacecraft attitude
control system (ACS); testing control modes, calibrating sensors and actuators,
and using the ACS to help commission the spacecraft instruments and to control
the propulsion system as the spacecraft was maneuvered into its final orbit.
This paper will discuss the chronology of the SDO launch and connnissioning,
showing the ACS analysis work performed to diagnose propellant slosh transient
and attitude oscillation anomalies that were seen during commissioning, and to
determine how to overcome them. The simulations and tests devised to demon-
strate correct operation of all onboard ACS modes and the activities in support
of instrument calibration will be discussed and the final maneuver plan per-
formed to bring SDO on station will be shown. In addition to detailin g these
commissioning and anomaly resolution activities, the unique set of tests per-
formed to characterize SDO's on-orbit jitter performance will be discussed.
INTRODUCTION
The Solar Dynamics Obsen atory (SDO) was successfully launched and deployed from its At-
las V launch vehicle on February 11, 2010. Three months later, on May 16, 2010, the fully com-
missioned heliophysics laboratory was handed over to Space Systems Mission Operations to be-
gin its science mission. SDO is an Explorer-class mission now operating in a geosynchronous
orbit, sending data twenty four hours a day to a dedicated ground station in White Sands, New
Mexico. It carries a suite of instruments designed to observe the Sun in multiple wavelengths at
unprecedented resolution. The Atmospheric Imaging Assembly (AIA) includes four telescopes
with 4096x4096 focal plane CODs that can image the full solar disk in seven extreme ultraviolet
and three ultraviolet-visible wavelengths. The Extreme Ultraviolet Variability Experiment (EVE)
collects time-correlated data on the activity of the Sun's corona. The Helioseismic and Magnetic
Imager (HMI) enables study of pressure waves moving through the body of the Sun.
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OVERVIEW OF THE SOLAR DYNAMICS OBSERVATORY MISSION
Figure 1 shows an image the SDO spacecraft. The side of the spacecraft shown at the top of
the figure is its Sun-pointing side. The overall length of SDO along the Sun-pointing axis is 4.5 m
and each side of the spacecraft bus is 2.2 in. The span of the deployed solar arrays is 6.25 m. SDO
launched with a total mass of 3000 kg, 1400 kg of which was propellant mass.
The science goal of SDO is to provide data to help understand the Sun's magnetic changes, to
determine how its magnetic field is generated and structured and how that energy is released.
SDO data and analysis will help develop the ability to predict the solar variations and their impact
on the Earth. SDO's three instruments measure the properties of the Sun and solar activity. The
large number of images and other measurements taken continuously over long periods of time
will allow scientists to see the oscillations of the Sun. These patterns can be used to look into and
through the Sun. More information about the SDO spacecraft and science mission can be found
on the NASA SDO website.*
Figure 1: Solar Dynamics Observatory
http://sdo.gsfc.iiasa.gov
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Attitude Control System Sensor and Actuator Suite
Figure 2 shows a mechanical drawing of the spacecraft giving the locations of the attitude con-
trol system (ACS) sensors and actuators and science instruments. The SDO ACS was designed to
tolerate any single hardware fault and retain the capability to meet all requirements for science
data quality. The suite of ACS sensors, actuators, and computational capabilities were selected
and arranged for performance and maximal redundancy; SDO ACS failure detection and correc-
tion (FDC) depends to a large extent on hardware redundancy. More inforination on the SDO
hardware placement can be found in Reference 1 and an extensive description of the SDO ACS
failure detection and correction design can be found in Reference 2.
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Figure 2: SDO Attitude Control System Hardware
ACS Sensors. The SDO sensor suite consists of sixteen Adcole coarse sun sensors (CSS), one
Adcole digital sun sensor (DSS), two Galileo Avionica autonomous, quatermon-output star track-
ers (ST), and three Kearfott Two-Axis Rate Assemblies used as SDO's inertial reference units
(IRUs). The CSSs are the only attitude sensors required in the most basic Sun-pointing mode. The
sixteen CSSs are divided into two independent sets of eight sensors each (CSSA and CSSB), and
each set of eight can provide an adequate Sun vector with any seven sensors being functional.
For fine attitude determination, an on-board Kalman filter provides adequate attitude know-
ledge with input from any two of the three fine-pointing units—DSS, STI, and ST2. To avoid
simultaneous blockages of both STs, they are mounted nearly perpendicular to the SDO Sun-
3
pointing axis (X axis), and far enough apart from each other that the Earth and Moon do not block
both at the same time throughout the science collection phase of the mission. The IRUs are ar-
ranged so that the sensitive axes from two units are aligned with each of the three body axes of
the Observatory. Thus, any two out of three IRUs will provide full three-axis rate information.
In addition to these sensors, the ACS also makes extensive use of the guide telescopes (GT)
mounted as part of the AIA instrument. Because of the high accuracy of the SDO science instru-
ments, the ACS uses the GT data as the best available knowledge of the Sun center. There are
four GTs, with one mounted to each of the four science telescopes; the ACTS only needs accurate
inforniation from one of the four GTs, selected by SDO scientists as the controlling guide tele-
scope (CGT), to perforn its science control duties. Each GT has a field of view (FOV) of 0.5 deg
within which sunlight illuminates at least one photodiode, and polarity of the control signal is
determined; this is called the acquisition range. When the Sun center is within approximately 90
arcseconds of the FOV center, the GT is capable of providing attitude information relative to the
Sun vector accurate to about 2 areseconds; this is referred to as the GT linear range and is re-
quired for accurate science data collection.
ACS Actuators. SDO guidance functions are actuated by four Goodrich 70-Nms reaction
wheel assemblies (RWA) and eight Ampac 5-lbf attitude control thrusters. (While not used for
attitude control, there is also one Aerojet R-41) model bi-propellant main engine producing
110 lbf of thrust used for orbit raising AV.) The RWAs are arranged in a pyramidal structure so
that any set of three provides full three-axis control capability. The ACS thrusters are grouped
into four pairs of thrusters, with one thruster of each pair linked to fuel and oxidizer (monomethyl
hydrazine and nitrogen tetroxide) by independent manifolds. In this way, the catastrophic failure
of any one thruster can only require the closing of one manifold, leaving the other set of four ca-
pable of performing all necessary ACS tasks.
In addition to attitude control activities, the ACS is also responsible for the pointing and con-
trol of the two high-gain antennas (HGA). Each antenna consists of a dish mounted on an eleva-
tion gimbal, with that mounted on an azimuth gimbal. If either antenna fails due to a gimbal or
electrical failure, the mission can still be completed. The greatest danger posed by the HGAs is
the irradiation of the spacecraft itself, HGA FDC provides protection from that event.
Electronics and Microprocessors. A full copy of the command and data handling system of
the SDO spacecraft resides on each of two independent main processors (MP). Only one of these
MPs is in control of the spacecraft at any time. Each of these MPs also operates an independent
copy of the attitude control task (ACT) and the on-board ephemeris. Most flight software tasks,
including the ACT, operate on a 200-ms cycle, except that the ephemeris operates on a one-
second cycle. Nominally, it is the job of the ACT to sample sensor data and issue actuator com-
mands to maintain attitude control of the spacecraft throughout the mission. There are also sepa-
rate microprocessors that reside in each of two independent but cross-strapped attitude control
electronics (ACE) boxes. These ACES are always powered, but only one can be in control at any
time. Both ACES route data from the CSSs, RWAs, IRUs, and various pressure and temperature
sensors to the MPs. Only the ACE in control accepts, validates, and passes through actuator
commands to the RWAs and the propulsion system's valves and thrusters from the MP in control.
If there is a disruption of ACT control over the ACE in control, that ACE will cease passing
through ACT actuator commands and will instead begin issuing commands of its own to the reac-
tion wheels from the Safehold mode running on it. Safehold is a simplified mode, being depen-
dent only on the CSSs and the RWA tachometer readings (during eclipse, if IRU signals are
available, they are used to null rates). If the primary ACE itself is disrupted, such as from a restart
due to a single-event upset (SEU), the other ACE will detect this state and assume control.
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Attitude Control System Mode Design
Figure 3 shows a diagram of the SDO ACS control modes and allowed transitions. The ACS
has four RWA-actuated modes and two thruster-actuated modes. More details about the ACS in
general and the control modes in particular can be found in References 1, 3, 4, and 5. As dis-
cussed in the previous section, one RWA-actuated mode resides on the ACE microprocessors;
this mode is called Safehold. The other five modes reside in the ACTT. Sun Acquisition (SunAcq)
Mode performs an attitude function similar to Safehold, in that it simply maintains a power-
positive, safe attitude with respect to the Sun using CSS signals. It differs from Safehold in that
IRU signals are used for angular rate information at all times.
For all other modes, attitude determination (AD) is performed with some combination of the
fine attitude sensors and propagation of IRU-derived rate information. An attitude solution may
be initialized either by accepting a valid ST quaternion (nominal) or by uploading an estimate by
ground command (available for testing and contingency). Once a solution is available, it may
simply be propagated using rate sensors, as is always done in the thruster based modes, or it may
be replaced either using one preferred ST or by ground override connnand. The most accurate
solution is obtained by combining all available fine attitude data from the two STs, the DSS, and
the IRUs using a Kalman filter.
Whatever AD method is selected in the software, Inertial Mode uses the solution for attitude
error calculation against the target attitude in all three axes. Inertial has two sub-modes that differ
only in the target calculation. One tracks a Sun-referenced target quatermon using the on-board
ephemeris to predict the appropriate inertially referenced quaternion for the Sun-referenced state.
The other maintains a commanded, absolute, inertially referenced quatermon. Science Mode, dur-
ing which most science data are collected, uses one of the specialized GTs to point a commanded
science reference boresight (SRB) accurately at the Sun. The roll error about that SRB is calcu-
lated using the same methods as Inertial, except that the target is always Sun-referenced.
The thruster modes are called DeltaH Mode and DeltaV Mode. DeltaH is used to manage sys-
tem angular momentum. With no magnetic torquers to gradually dump momentum, the thrusters
must be used occasionally to remove momentum. To maximize time between uses of DeltaH, the
mode allows a non-zero angular momentum to be placed into the body, which can be set to the
opposite of any predicted angular momentum change. The attitude target for DeltaH is simply the
attitude estimate at mode entry. DeltaV is used for changing or maintaining orbit parameters. It
uses an absolute, inertially referenced target similar to Inertial's absolute targeting, and that target
may be updated by command during a DeltaV maneuver.
Some transitions between modes are not allowed. By placing the in-control ACE into Safehold
mode, the ACS mode running on the MP is ignored, so Safehold may be reached from any MP
mode. Any MP mode may transition to SunAcq or to Inertial, including self-transitions. Science
mode is the only other mode that may self-transition, and it may also be entered autonomously
from Inertial mode when the Sun is in the field-of-view of the controlling guide telescope. DeltaH
may be entered from SunAcq or Inertial mode. However, Science and DeltaV may only be en-
tered from Inertial mode, with Science accessible only when Sun-referenced targeting is active
and DeltaV accessible only when absolute targeting is active. These restrictions avoid large atti-
tude changes occurring due only to misunderstandings of the two targeting sub-modes in Inertial.
Thrusters are always disabled upon exiting DeltaH or DeltaV modes.
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Figure 3: SDO Mode Transition Diagram
LAUNCH AND INITIAL ACQUISITION
After a one day launch slip caused by high winds at Cape Canaveral, SDO successfully
launched at 15:23 GMT (10:23 EST) on February 11, 2010. On schedule an hour and thirty-six
minutes later, the SDO Mission Operations Center established first contact with the spacecraft. At
17:07:39, SDO separated from the third stage of the Atlas V launch vehicle, having been safely
delivered into its 8,800 loin x 41,700 loin, 28 0 geostationary transfer orbit. Figure 4 shows the
SDO spacecraft rates leading up to and after spacecraft separation. (All times in plots are GMT.)
The angular rates measured prior to separation are due to the third stage of the launch vehicle
maneuvering SDO into its separation attitude. As shown, the separation event itself is relatively
benign, imparting fairly low rates on the spacecraft, a total of 3 Nms of system momentum.
SDO's solar arrays deployed automatically approximately five seconds after separation. Figure 5
shows the Sun angle, as measured by the CSSs, during initial acquisition. The requirement at ini-
tial acquisition for both SDO's SunAcq and Safehold Modes was to bring the spacecraft within
15° of the Sun within 30 minutes. In operation, SDO's SunAcq Mode was able to bring the
spacecraft that close to the Sun within 15 seconds, with a total settling time of about three mi-
nutes. Note that, since the CSSs are located on the solar array panels, the Sun angles were not
accurate until the solar arrays were deployed. Eighty-four minutes after separation, SDO's two
HGAs were deployed. Figure 6 shows the spacecraft rate disturbance caused as each antenna was
deployed; as expected, the primary disturbance is in the Y axis of the spacecraft.
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Figure 4: Separation and Acquisition Spacecraft Rates
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Figure 6: Spacecraft Rates at High Gain Antenna Deploy
Safehold Checkout
One of the first post-separation and initial acquisition activities planned for SDO was a check-
out of SDO's Safehold Mode. As the lowest level, minimum hardware component mode meant to
ensure the safety of the spacecraft in the event of an anomaly, it was important to verify that the
mode would work as designed. Additionally, because SDO had redundant ACE boxes in which
Safehold was hosted, Safehold checkout was run on both ACEA and ACEB. The ACEA Safehold
Mode test was run for ten minutes beginning at 21:50 GMT, followed immediately by a ten-
minute test on ACEB. The plots shown in Figure 7 and Figure 8 are for the checkout of the
ACEA Safehold Mode; ACEB yielded similar results.
SDO's Safehold Mode was designed to operate with a minimum sensor complement. This
means that the only sensor inputs that it normally uses are the output from the CSSs and from the
RWA tachometers. Using just the CSS inputs, Safehold Mode is able to determine its position
with respect to the Sun and is able to derive its rate about the two directions transverse to the sun-
line. When the spacecraft is close to Sun-pointing (within 15 degrees), Safehold Mode determines
the X axis rate—the rate about the sunline—from the changing momentum in the reaction wheels.
If the RWA momentum is too low, the derived rate is deemed unreliable and the X axis rate error
in the Safehold controller is zeroed. This limit is 2 Nms for the square root of the magnitude of
the Y and Z components of the RWA momentum in the body frame.
During Safehold checkout, the spacecraft saw sunline rates which cycled between high and
low values. The spacecraft remained Sun-pointing, but the roll around the sunline alternated be-
tween periods of low roll rates and higher roll rates. This response is evident in the RWA momen-
tum in the body frame plot shown in the upper section of Figure 7.
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Figure 7: Safehold Checkout RWA Momentum in the Body Frame
The lower plot of Figure 7 shows what is happening in this case. When the YZ component of
the RWA momentum is below 2 Nms, the sunline error rate fed to the Safehold controller is ze-
roed. By zeroing out the small rate, the true error in RWA momentum is allowed to build up
without being counteracted by the controller. At some point, though, the accumulated momentum
in the YZ plane exceeds 2 Nms and the controller begins reacting to it. As the controller reacts to
the error and begins to lower it, the total YZ momentum will again go under 2 Nms. This reaction
is what causes the alternating periods of lower and higher sunline rates during the Safehold test.
Figure 8 shows the corresponding sunline rate signal used by the controller. At a higher overall
system momentum, the sunline rate estimation algorithm would behave more consistently and the
overall control would be better. At the low system momentum that the checkout test was run,
which is more typical of SDO's operations, the Safehold Mode rate estimation and control algo-
rithms are sufficient to safely and stably keep the spacecraft pointed at the Sun, which is power
and thermally safe, as designed.
After checkout of Safehold Mode, the final "initial checkout" activity performed was polarity
checks of the two sets of ACS thruster command paths. These polarity checks were performed
while the spacecraft was in SunAcq Mode via manual thruster pulse commands sent to the ACE,
with the results of each thruster firing being evaluated by the induced spacecraft rate and change
in system momentum. The checkout was performed through both the ACEA and ACEB boxes,
with enough 200-ms pulses fired on each thruster to get consistent results from one firing to the
next, in an effort to blow out any bubbles that Inight have gotten into the propellant lines. The
results of these tests showed nominal operation of all ACS thrusters through both ACE boxes.
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The checkout activities performed in the first day after SDO's launch and initial acquisition
were done to verify that the spacecraft was in a good state of health and ready to begin its com-
missioning period, which would carry it through the next several months. The first major activity
that was conducted during this period was the commissioning of SDO's hardware, software and
science instruments. Additionally, a series of orbit-raising maneuvers were conducted in order to
move SDO from its GTO orbit into its final mission orbit, a geosynchronous orbit at 102° west
longitude, inclined at 28°. While these activities were conducted in parallel during the commis-
sioning period, this paper will first discuss SDO's orbit raising, followed by the commissioning
activities for SDO's ACS sensors, actuators, control modes, and software. Finally, a short de-
scription of the innovative tests performed to characterize SDO's on-orbit jitter performance will
be shown.
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Figure S: Safehold Checkout Calculated Sunline Error Rate
ORBIT RAISING OF THE SOLAR DYNAMICS OBSERVATORY
The initial plan to carry SDO from its initial GTO of 8,800 kin x 41,700 kin to its final geo-
synchronous 42,164 km circular orbit consisted of ten maneuvers conducted over a period of
three weeks. Table 1 shows the nominal orbit raising plan, consisting of one engineering burn, six
apogee motor firings (AMFs), where the primary AV would come from SDO's 100 lbf main en-
gine, followed by three trim burns (TMFs) performed using ACS thrusters only. The engineering
burn was designed as a short "dress rehearsal" for a full apogee motor firing. In the engineering
burn and each of the AMFs, the first 20 seconds of the burn would use ACS thrusters only, with
thrusters off-pulsing for attitude control, and was meant as a settling burn to get the fuel settled in
the propellant and oxidizer tanks before the main engine kicked in. After this settling burn, the
rest of the burn would include the main engine, with the ACS thrusters in an on-pulsing mode for
attitude control. See Reference 6 for a more complete description of the SDO orbit raising plan.
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Table 1: SDO Nominal Orbit Raising Plan
Maneuver Date and Time
(GI\IT)
Burn Length
(sec)
AV
(m/s)
Engineering Burn February 11, 19:19 80.0 10.67
Apogee Motor Firing 1 February 14, 02:55 1119.8 191.38
Apogee Motor Firing 2 February 16, 02:51 1040.0 188.74
Apogee Motor Firing 3 February 18, 06:48 1757.8 350.06
Apogee Motor Firing 4 February 20, 06:01 1126.8 245.77
Apogee Motor Firing 5 February 22, 13:47 607.2 139.18
Apogee Motor Firing 6 February 25, 04:01 533.4 127.12
Trim Motor Firing 1 February 28, 01:52 168.0 7.46
Trim Motor Firing 2 March 2, 12:21 193.6 8.62
Trim Motor Firing 3 March 4, 23:26 298.6 13.36
Propulsion System Commissioning and AMF-1
Due to heating concerns from one of the science instruments, the engineering burn was de-
layed from the nominal plan for four days, and was executed on February 15, at 02:42 GMT.
Thruster polarity and rough thruster performance had been checked on launch day, so the only
other propulsion system commissioning activity necessary before the engineering burn was to fire
the pyrotechnic valves to pressurize the system. As shown in Figure 9, it was possible to see that
the pyros had been fired based on disturbances to the spacecraft's attitude and rate.
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The ACS performance during the engineering burn was as expected. There were some minor
FDC limit threshold crossings that occurred during the burin, but nothing that raised any concerns.
One such FDC indication was a derived DSS rate vs IRU rate comparison check that showed
some failures that were eventually tracked down to error in the DSS rate derivation that occurred
near the edges of its field of view. A second FDC indication seen, a failure of the comparison of
the Sun angle as calculated by the A and B side CSSs and the attitude determination (AD) solu-
tion, will be discussed in the next section of this paper. As a result of the nominal performance of
the engineering burn, the first apogee motor firing (AMF-1) was planned for February 17.
One day before AMF-1, the team elected to use manual thruster commands (firing thrusters in
pairs) to reduce the system momentum in preparation for the upcoming burn. This was done ma-
nually rather than with SDO's DeltaH Mode for two reasons. First, the DeltaH Mode had not
been tested yet and the team did not want any unexpected anomalies with that mode to delay the
first frill maneuver. Second, it was possible using these manual commands along with estimates
of the daily system momentum buildup to bias the final momentum at the time of the unload such
that by the time of AMF-1 the system momentum would be very low.
AMF-1 was executed at on February 17, with the burn starting at 22:15:28 GMT. The total
length of the burn was 1133.4 seconds, slightly longer than the prelaunch plan, and completed
successfully. The system momentum magnitude upon exit from DeltaV Mode was 3.07 Nms.
Similar to the engineering burn, there were no failures or major problems during the maneuver,
though some of the same FDC limit threshold crossings were seen (DSS vs IRU rate comparison,
CSSA vs CSSB vs AD attitude comparison). The only thing that occurred during the maneuver of
potential serious concern was the fact that the KA-band electronic box temperature hit its red lim-
it just before the bum finished. As a result of this, the flight dynamics team was directed to replan
the remaining AMFs to limit the burn time to 20 minutes or less, and new operational constraints
and procedures were defined for future AMFs in case the thermal limits were reached again.
Figure 10 shows the attitude error during AMF-1, beginning one minute before the burn
started. As expected, because the main engine is aligned along the X axis, the primary distur-
bances are in the Y and Z axes. The attitude errors during the maneuver are kept to within ±2°,
for the most part, well within the f5° requirement and FDC limit for DeltaV Mode. As also
shown in Figure 10, the limit cycle during DeltaV Mode is one-sided for most of the burn. To-
wards the end of the burn, though, we see what looks like a two-sided limit cycle. Figure 11
shows the phase plane plot of the maneuver, as well as a plot of the system momentum magni-
tude. To give some sense of directionality on the phase plane plots, the data is plotted with the
first third of the burn in red, the second third in green, and the last third in blue. As would be ex-
pected in the phase plane after seeing the attitude error, all of the limit cycles appear to be stable,
with the Z axis being the largest. The system momentum magnitude plot is what would be hoped
for in a well-behaved control mode. After an initial transient when the main engine kicks in after
the settling burn (which is well within the FDC limit of 20 Nms), it varies for the rest of the ma-
neuver at a fairly low level.
Based on the nominal real-time results of this maneuver, along with post-maneuver recon-
struction from the flight dynamics team indicating expected AV performance from the thrusters,
the planning process began for AMF-2, scheduled for two days later on February 19.
Propellant Slosh Anomaly, Investigation, and Recovery
AMF-2 was planned to be a 1080 second burn beginning on February 19 at 21:55:32 GMT.
The burn began on schedule, but approximately 37 seconds into the burn, the high system mo-
mentum FDC limit was tripped, aborting the burn and putting the spacecraft into SunAcq Mode.
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Once the FDC tripped and put the spacecraft into SunAcq Mode, that mode behaved as de-
signed and quickly acquired the Sun. The calculated system momentum, while high enough at
around 23 Nms to trip the FDC limit during DeltaV Mode, was well within the capability of Sun-
Acq. The first action of the flight support and maneuver teams after the anomaly was to ensure
the safety of the spacecraft and clean up the state of the spacecraft telemetry status monitors
(TSMs) and other FDC components to protect the spacecraft while in SunAcq. Additionally, in
order to reduce the relatively high momentum state of the spacecraft, manual thruster commands
were performed to reduce the system momentum towards zero. Manual thruster firings were used
to reduce this system momentum, with an as-expected momentum change occurring for each fir-
ing. As a first step towards debugging the anomaly, additional firings were performed using each
thruster pair to verify correct operation of all of the ACS thrusters. After the spacecraft was safe,
an anomaly team was formed to determine the cause of the DeltaV Mode anomaly.
Figure 12 shows the components and magnitude of the spacecraft system momentum during
AMF-2. The momentum state upon beginning the maneuver (T = 0 on the plot) was relatively
low at a magnitude of just under 5 Nms. When the main engine kicked in (T = 20), a large oscil-
latory change in the Z axis system momentum begins, and it is the momentum in this axis that
drives the system momentum magnitude to exceed the FDC limit of 20 Nms and abort the burn
after 37 seconds.
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Figure 12: AA/IF-2 System Momentum and FDC Limit
The anomaly team identified a number of potential causes for the anomaly, including sensor
failure, actuator (thruster or main engine) failure or previously unobserved misalignment, DeltaV
Mode controller instability, other hardware failures, and unmodeled dynamics. Because of all the
previous testing and examination of current data, there were not any sensor, actuator, or other
hardware failures that seemed to be likely causes, and given its correct functioning during the
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engineering burn and AMF-1, DeltaV controller instability did not seem likely. After examining
the system momentum and rate data during the aborted maneuver, it quickly became clear that the
most likely cause of the anomaly was an unnodeled disturbance caused by propellant slosh.
Once the anomaly team successfully identified propellant slosh as the reason the burn was ab-
orted, they began an intensive analysis and design effort to come Lip with a way to mitigate the
slosh dynamics to allow the use of the main engine. Meanwhile, because SDO was in an unfavor-
able radiation environment and because the desire was to get the spacecraft into its science orbit
as quickly as possible, the team decided to continue with its orbit raising schedule, planning ma-
neuvers using only the ACS thrusters. Because the ACS thrusters are much smaller and therefore
less efficient, achieving the final science orbit without going back to the main engine would re-
quire an additional five or six burns and an additional two or more weeks. While the anomaly
team did its work, three maneuvers—designated AMF-213, AMF-3, and AMF4—were per-
formed using ACS thrusters only. All of these maneuvers were successful, though it should be
noted that the attitude error during these maneuvers showed a more pronounced tendency towards
a two-sided limit cycle in the Z axis.
Figure 13 shows one of the data reconstructions performed by the anomaly team. This shows
an estimate of the propellant slosh torque acting on the spacecraft. It was derived by calculating a
system torque from the system momentum change and subtracting an estimate of the torque im-
parted by the ACS thrusters and the misalignment of the main engine. Oscillatory propellant slosh
dynamics can be seen in both the Y and Z axes of the spacecraft, with the largest effect shown in
the Z axis. Note from this plot that it appears that the propellant slosh is damping out, indicating
that there may not be an inherent instability to the spacecraft DeltaV Mode because of slosh and
that AMF-2 may not have aborted if the FDC limits had been able to be safely set a little higher.
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Most of the prelaunch propellant slosh analysis for SDO had been done using a fill fraction of
18-25% and was mainly concerned with the effect of slosh on the jitter seen by the science in-
struments. The fill fraction at the beginning of AMF-1 was 96% and for AMF-2 was 80%. Based
on the pre-launch analysis, we expected propellant slosh effects to increase as the fuel tanks emp-
tied and to reach a maximum around a 60% fill fraction. The anomaly team added a slosh model
to the spacecraft high-fidelity simulation (H1Fi) and attempted to tune its parameters to match the
observed behavior of the spacecraft from the AMF-2 burn (and then the AMF-213, AMF-3, and
AMF-4 burns). Their modeling was not able to completely replicate the observed dynamics, but it
did show the correct trends and gave them the confidence to begin developing and testing poten-
tial mitigations.
After a lot of time and effort, the anomaly team proposed three simple, easy-to-implement
changes to the spacecraft that they felt would solve the problem. First, they suggested increasing
the length of the settling burn from 20 seconds to four minutes. That length was selected to en-
compass the "geyser mode" that can be seen upon initial thruster firing, but did not allow enough
time for fuel disturbances to damp out before the main engine firing. Second, the team suggested
raising the FDC limit on system momentum to 34 Nms. The 20 Nms limit was chosen based on a
two-failure scenario (how much momentum could be placed into the spacecraft by a stuck-on
thruster and have the spacecraft successfully recover with one failed wheel); 34 Nms reflected a
more realistic failure case. Finally, the team wanted to disable the effect of the structural filter,
included in DeltaV Mode to allow it to meet the design requirement for 12 dB modal suppression
of all flexible modes, by appropriately setting its parameters to ones and zeros. The increased
phase delay caused by the structural filter was affecting DeltaV Mode's ability to react to the
slosh dynamics, and the observed flexible modes and damping seen during the appendage dep-
loyments (refer back to Figure 4 and Figure 6) indicated that this could be done safely.
AMF-5 was the first post-anomaly maneuver to be performed with the main engine. In order
to mitigate the operational effects of another failure, this maneuver was done as a "hybrid" ma-
neuver. The 50 minute maneuver was done as a 40-minute, ACS-thruster-only settling burn fol-
lowed by the final 10 minutes using the main engine. This was done so that if using the main en-
gine caused the maneuver to fail once again, the overall maneuver would still impart a fair
amount of AV to the spacecraft. To the relief of everyone on the project team, AMF-5 was a suc-
cess. In fact, the changes made to mitigate the effect of the slosh dynamics primarily the re-
moval of the structural filtersignificantly improved the response of the controller. After the
success of AMF-5, three more AMFs were performed. Figure 14 and Figure 15 show the attitude
error, phase plane plots, and system momentum magnitude for AMF-6. As can be seen, the re-
moval of the structural filter from the DeltaV Mode controller significantly improved the re-
sponse of the spacecraft attitude, resulting in a low magnitude one-sided limit cycle. The phase
plane plots (plotted using the same scale as that used for Figure 11 for AMF-1) show much
smaller limit cycles for all axes, and lower overall system momentum variations.
A total of 13 maneuvers (including the aborted AMF-2) were performed to move SDO into its
mission orbit. After the engineering burn, the successful AMF-1 and the aborted AMF-2, three
"AMFs" were performed using ACS thrusters only, followed by the main engine return-to-service
hybrid AMF-5, three additional AMFs, and three TMF trims burns. The propellant slosh anomaly
resulted in an additional three maneuvers and a delay of only one week in achieving SDO's mis-
sion orbit. On March 16, at the conclusion of TMF-3, SDO achieved its final science orbit.
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ATTITUDE CONTROL SYSTEM COMMISSIONING
While SDO's orbit raising activities were ongoing, and for another six weeks afterward, the
commissioning, testing, and calibration of the ACS sensors, actuators, and control modes contin-
ued in parallel. The bulk of these tests consisted of ACS control mode checkouts and calibration
slews used to calibrate the different sensors and actuators, as well as the science instruments and
the AIA guide telescopes. In general, the results of these tests showed good performance of the
ACS system, meeting all of its requirements. In the remainder of this section, we will discuss
some of the interesting things discovered during the commissioning process, including some
small performance puzzles that were solved.
Gyro Bias Oscillations
The day after launch, the major activities were the checkout of Inertial Mode, followed by a
series of slews using that mode to provide data to calibrate the IRUs. Both of those activities were
successful, but small spacecraft oscillations were observed in the IRU bias estimates calculated
by the onboard Kalman filter, as shown in the plots on the left hand side of Figure 16. Because
the oscillation was at such a low frequency, with a roughly 30 minute period, they were well
within the bandAvidth of the controller, so the controller followed the oscillating error in the atti-
tude estimate, resulting in actual spacecraft motion. The fact that the spacecraft was actually
tracking these oscillations is shown in the guide telescope error signals on the left-hand side of
Figure 17. Data from these tests, from subsequent tests of SDO Science Mode, and from all other
suitable activities were examined. The oscillations seen on all of the different tests were approx-
imately 10-20 aresec and would not cause SDO's Science Mode to violate its pointing require-
ment of [35,70,70] aresec, but they remained a concern to the science instrument teams. It was
determined by looking at this data that the IRUs were the cause, and that the frequency and the
amplitude of the oscillations was temperature related.
Because of concerns of the effect of the 87 Hz frequency of the IRU's internal heaters on the
spacecraft power bus, the decision had been made not to use them in flight except during a few
crucial operations. As a result the IRUs experienced temperature variations that were different
from the manufacturer's design and testing profile. That these temperature variations caused the
bias oscillations was confirined by first running a test with the IRU internal heaters turned on; the
results of this are shown in the bias estimates and guide telescope signals in the plots on the right
hand sides of Figure 16 and Figure 17. Note that because of different average temperatures, the
secular component of both the gyro bias estimate and guide telescope error signals are different in
the unheated and heated cases, but the scales of each side-by-side plot are the same to shoe- the
lower magnitude of the oscillatory component. This test established that the bias oscillation could
be reduced through use of the IRU internal heaters, but concerns about the effects on the space-
craft power system remained.
After the first IRU internal heater test, the flight support team ran two tests instead using soft-
ware-based control of the IRU heaters, first with a setpoint of 40 C and then with a setpoint of 67
C. The software control was relatively coarse, allowing peak-to-peak variations about the setpoint
of roughly 2 C. As expected, changing the temperature setpoints resulted in changes to the ampli-
tude and frequency of the observed oscillations. However, they did not significantly decrease the
magnitude of the oscillations.
Following the heater tests and the examination of their results, the team decided that the low-
est-impact solution to the problem, if possible, would be to adjust the gains of the Kalman filter to
make it less sensitive to the low frequency oscillations of the gyro biases caused by the thermal
variations. After much analysis and simulation, a new set of gains was available for test.
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Figure 18 shows a plot of the estimated gyro biases before and after the adjustment of the
Kalman filter gains. As can be seen, while the retuned filter does not eliminate the oscillations
completely—certainly not as much as using the IRU internal heater—it does diminish their mag-
nitude significantly, bringing the actual oscillation of the Observatory down to a level acceptable
to the SDO science teams.
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Coarse Sun Sensor Sun Angle Calculation
As discussed in the previous section, during the engineering burn and AMF-1, the FDC limit
for a Sun vector mismatch (a three-way comparison between CSSA, CSSB, and AD calculated
vectors) tripped multiple times. Though the persistence of these limit violations were not nearly
long enough to trip any autonomous FDC actions, the team was interested in understanding why
they were occurring.
Figure 19 shows the unit sphere of possible Sun vectors in the SDO body reference frame. The
dark lines superimposed on the sphere represent the attitude path taken by SDO as it slewed out
to the burn attitude for AMF-1 and then back to pointing at the Sun aftenvards. The colors of the
points on the sphere represent how many individual C:SSs register sunlight at each point. The
green areas are regions of 4-sensor coverage, the blue areas are regions of 3-sensor coverage, and
the cyan areas are regions of 2-sensor coverage; different algorithms are used to calculate the Sun
vector for the 4-sensor case than the 3- and 2-sensor cases. During nominal science data collec-
tion, four CSSB have visibility of the Sun, and it is in this condition where the calculation of the
Sun angle is the most accurate. As shown on the figure, there are several locations along the path
where only two or three CSSB can see the Sun. It is in these zones that the limit trips occurred. On
both ACEs, the times of CSSA vs CSSB mismatches occurred during times of decreased Sun
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coverage. In the regions where fewer than four sensors are used, the comparison between CSSA
and CSSB is more likely to be different, primarily because the two ACES may transition between
the 4-sensor and 3-sensor algorithms at a slightly different times.
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Figure 19: CSS Coverage Map During AMF-1 Slews
ON-ORBIT JITTER TESTING
Two of the SDO instruments, Atmospheric Imaging Assembly (AM) and Helioseismic and
Magnetic Imager (HMI), are sensitive to high frequency pointing perturbations and have sub-
aresecond level line-of-sight (LOS) jitter requirements. Extensive modeling and analysis efforts
were directed in estimating the amount of jitter disturbing the science instruments.' A jitter test
plan was developed to verify analysis approaches and reduce uncertainties in the models. This
plan consisted of hardware component tests, structural component tests, and assembly level tests.
The hardware component test results were used for calibrating the disturbance input models that
drove the observatory structural and optical models used to predict the LOS jitter performance.
Although detailed analysis and assembly level tests were perfornied to obtain good jitter pre-
dictions, there were still several sources of uncertainty in the system. The structural finite element
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model did not have all the modes correlated to test data at high frequencies (>50 Hz). The per-
formance of the instrument stabilization system was not known exactly, but was expected to be
close to the analytical model. A true disturbance-to-LOS observatory level test was not available
due to the tight schedule of the flight spacecraft, the cost in time and manpower, difficulties in
creating gravity negation systems, and risks of damaging flight hardware. To protect the observa-
tory jitter performance against model uncertainties, the SDO jitter team devised several on-orbit
jitter reduction plans in addition to reserving margins on analysis results. Since some of these
plans severely restricted the capabilities of several spacecraft components (e.g. wheels and high
gain antennas), the SDO team performed on-orbit jitter tests to determine which jitter reduction
plans, if any, were necessary to satisfy science LOS jitter requirements.
Post-SDO launch, a three-day test period was dedicated to measure AIA and HMI LOS jitter
induced by various spacecraft and instrument mechanisms. In the following sections, brief de-
scriptions of the reaction wheel and high gain antenna jitter tests and samples of on-orbit mea-
surements are provided. More detailed jitter testing information, pre-flight prediction versus mea-
surements, and instrument mechanism test data will be subjects of a separate paper.
Reaction Wheel Jitter Test
Based on pre-flight jitter analysis estimates, the wheel speeds were limited to X400 rev/min
(RPM) to meet AIA and HMI jitter requirements.' This constraint forces the wheels to reverse
direction about once every four weeks and uses only a small portion of the available wheel speed
range of X6000 RPM. As the wheel reverses direction, a small increase in LOS motion would
occur and was considered an acceptable error to the science team. However, the team preferred to
reduce the frequency of wheel reversals and the number of thruster maneuvers required to unload
wheel momentum. The objective of the wheel jitter tests was to measure the actual wheel-induced
jitter on orbit, which was expected to be smaller than the analytical prediction.
During the wheel jitter test, all wheel speeds were driven from a low speed to a maximum
speed of about 1000 RPM, and then driven back down to low speed levels. Wheel speed changes
were achieved by commanding wheel torques along the null space vector direction to avoid inter-
ference with the attitude control torque commands. The primary .) itter sensor for this test was the
HMI limb sensor measuring LOS errors at 512 Hz. The four AIA guide telescope signals also
provided data with sample rates of 256 Hz for telescopes #1 and #3, and 128 Hz for telescopes #2
and #4. Both HMI and AIA instruments can store 3 minutes of data and require 30 minutes to
download the data to the ground. To accommodate the instrument data storage and download ca-
pabilities, the wheel speeds were accelerated during data collection periods (-3 min) and held
constant during data dumping periods (-30 min). Furthermore, during the speed acceleration pe-
riods, the acceleration level was small enough (-1 RPM/see) to ensure that structural modes
would be fiully excited (e.g. reach maximum amplitude), similar to nominal operating conditions
where the wheel speeds change slowly.
The HMI instrument stabilization control system (ISS) was opened while wheel speeds in-
creased to 1000 RPM and closed while wheel speeds decreased back to low levels. Since HMI
nominally functions with a closed-loop instrument control system, jitter data collected during the
speed decrement section was compared to the requirement. In Figure 20, the top plot shows the
largest AIA LOS measurements from all four telescopes, the middle plot shows the HMI LOS
measurement, and the bottom plot shows the cor responding absolute wheel speed levels for four
wheels. In the plot legend, LOS Y and LOS Z refer to the tip and tilt motion of the instrument
LOS vector.
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Figure 20: Wheel Jitter Results: AIA/HMI LOS Measurements and Wheel Speeds
These jitter measurements demonstrated that the AIA LOS requirement was met for all wheel
speeds tested, whereas the HMI LOS requirement was violated when the lowest wheel speed
reached —840 RPM. Based on these results, the SDO team decided to extend the wheel speed lim-
it from ±400 RPM to ±800 RPM, and thereby reduce the number of direction reversals each
wheel will experience over its lifetime and prolong the period between thruster momentum un-
loads.
High Gain Antenna (HGA) Jitter Test
The goal of the HGA tests was to characterize the jitter induced by HGA operation, and if
possible, remove constraints on HGA operation if induced jitter is sufficiently low. The objective
was to operate the HGA actuators in all four gimbal axes for a range of representative pulse rates
to determine the conservatism, if any, in the pre-flight jitter predictions.
Pre-flight jitter analysis demonstrated that the peak jitter occurred when steps from multiple
actuators interfered constructively.' In rare cases, this interference resulted in a doubling of in-
duced jitter. To avoid this phenomenon, a stagger-step algorithm was implemented to prevent
actuators on the +Z and -Z antennas from taking steps during the same 200-ins HGA control
cycle.' Even with the stagger-step implementation, high jitter was still predicted to occur very
infrequently (less than 1% of the time) and for short durations. AIA was relatively insensitive to
this effect, since the resulting image loss could fit within the imaging data continuity budget.
However, HMI has a registration requirement that all of the images in a sequence must be taken
in a suitable jitter environment. Therefore, the peak jitter was not acceptable. The operational
constraint imposed in order to meet HMI requirements took the form of a No Step Request (NSR)
flag, sent from HMI to the ACS system, which requests the ACS to not move any of the HGAS
gimbals after a specified period for a specified duration.
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The HGAS test sequence had two major components:
Single-step commands were sent to each of the four actuators, in one of several anten-
na joint configurations (e.g. various azimuth (AZ) and elevation (EL) gimbal angles),
starting from a quiet state. The antennas were positioned and held fixed for several
seconds to allow any transient motions to die out. The objective of these tests was to
see the peak jitter from a single actuator, which provided a floor (minimum jitter lev-
el), as well as providing an estimate for peak jitter (twice the single-step jitter).
Variable step rate commands were sent to each of the four actuators, within the no-
minal operating range of 0 to 140 deg/hr (maximum allowable jitter rate). The peak
jitter occurs when spacecraft modes above 50 Hz are excited. Therefore. the harinon-
ics of the actuator pulses had to align to a fraction of 0.02 seconds with the jitter-
sensitive modes (identified from the single-step response above) in order to reach
peak jitter. By increasing the individual gimbal rate from 0 to 140 deb/hr with inter-
mediate rates chosen to match typical tracking rates, the goal was to capture peak
HGA-induced jitter during nominal operations.
The worst case AIA and HMI LOS jitter measurements are illustrated in Figure 21 and Figure
22, respectively. In these figures, the first four visible jitter peaks are induced by single gimbal
steps executed 10 sec apart, with the AZ gimbal stepping twice and then followed by EL gimbal
stepping twice. The variable-step rate test results are shown approximately 15 sec after the last
EL gimbal step. For the results shown, a single EL gimbal step violates the HGA-induced jitter
requirement and the LOSjitter gets worse as the gimbal step rate increases.
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Figure 22: HMI LOS Measurements from HGA Jitter Test
Contrary to the team's expectations, the HGA jitter tests showed flight measurements were
higher than pre-flight predictions at various HGA joint configurations, despite several levels of
conservatism on assumed damping, and the large margins used in the jitter analysis. 10 As a result,
HGA jitter mitigation options (stagger-stepping and NSR flags) were enabled to meet instrument
LOS jitter requirements. The instigation algorithms did work as expected and greatly reduced
HGA-induced jitter in science images.
CONCLUSION
On May 17, 2010, the SDO Project Manager Liz Citrin "handed over the keys" of SDO to
Space Science Mission Operations, signifying the successful conclusion of commissioning and
the formal beginning of its science mission. As early as March 31, though, when AIA captured
the First Light image shown in Figure 23, SDO was destined for success. Due to the robust design
of the ACS subsystem and with the skill and dedication of the flight support team in diagnosing
the anomalies seen in flight, the SDO ACS was a key factor in this success.
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